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This paper aims at the proper description of the apparent alternation presented in ‎(1):  
(1) a.  John walked Mary to her house.  
b.  John walked (to her house).  
The hallmark of the alternation in ‎(1) is that the intransitive variant is headed by an 
unergative verb. We will call the transitive sentence of this type the unergative-based 
transitives throughout this paper.1  
In this paper, we will focus on the issue of the (non-)obligatoriness of a PP for 
licensing this type of transitives. The status of PPs has been the locus of controversy 
in the literature, and the aim of the present paper is to elucidate the condition 
underlying the variable grammatical judgments often reported. Since whether PPs are 
obligatory or not and what type of PPs are allowed have been crucial for analyses of 
the „alternation‟ and theories of argument realization, the clarification of the condition 
for PPs will contribute to the further understanding of this area.  
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 will make a preliminary 
observation of the distribution of PPs in the unergative-based transitives in English. In 
Section 3, we will introduce the notion of sociative causation (Shibatani and Pardeshi 
2002) to give a proper generalization for the distribution of PPs. We also compare our 
generalization with the analysis given by Maruta (1998) in section 3.3. Section 4 
concludes the paper.  
                                                        
*
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1
 Levin (1993: 31) calls the alternation Induced Action Alternation, and Brousseau and Ritter (1991) 
name it the Compelled Movement Alternation.  
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2 THE DISTRIBUTION OF PPS 
2.1 PPs: Obligatory or not? 
The complication of the unergative-based transitives stems, as we noted above, from 
the variable judgments among speakers with regard to the status of PPs. Some studies 
(Levin 1993; Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995; Maruta 1998) claim the necessity of 
PPs for licensing the transitive sentences in ‎(2). Others, on the other hand, maintain 
that they do not need to be present. The former position is further divided into two 
subgroups, one of which observes that only a certain type of PPs is allowed, and the 
other does not pose such a restriction. Thus, three judgment patterns have been 
acknowledged in the literature, as illustrated in Table 1:  
(2) a.  The general marched the soldiers to the tents.  
b.  The general marched the soldiers along the river.  
c.  The general marched the soldiers.  
 
literature judgments 
 (2a) (2b) (2c) 
(i)  Levin (1993), Levin and Rappaport 
Hovav (1995), Maruta (1998) 
OK * * 
(ii)  Folli and Harley (2006) OK OK * 
(iii) Davidse and Geyskens (1998), Kageyama 
(2000), Erteschik-Shir and Rapoport 
(2005) 
OK OK OK 
<Table 1> Judgment Patterns 
The first group of people claims that only ‎(2)a should be acceptable, where the PP is a 
bounded one, and if there is no bounded PP, the construction is judged to be 
ungrammatical. The second position is that ‎(2)b, as well as ‎(2)a, is allowed, claiming 
that the boundedness is not a crucial factor. The third group reports that all of the 
three can be judged to be grammatical, and thus claims that PPs, whether bounded or 
unbounded, do not serve as a determinant of the transitive construction.  
Among the three, we would like to agree with the third party, as we will see in the 
next section. At least to our knowledge, however, no research has elucidated how and 
when the patterns of judgment vary. This paper tackles this issue, and claims that the 
patterns are closely related to types of causation described.  
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2.2 Types of PPs 
Let us first observe what kind of PPs are allowed in the unergative-based transitives.  
Locative PPs can be divided into two subcategories, depending on whether they 
are directional or not. The [+direction] category is further divided into two groups, 
[+bounded] and [-bounded] (e.g. Wunderlich 1991; Jackendoff 1990), resulting in a 
three-way classification. Representative PPs of each category are given in ‎(3) and ‎(4):  
(3) [+direction] 
 a. [+bounded]  
  to, into, across,…etc.  
 b. [-bounded]  
  along, through, toward…etc.   
(4) [-direction] 
 on, in, around, …etc. 
It is well known that the PPs with the [+direction][+bounded] features yield telic 
events when they are combined with unergative activity verbs, which are atelic 
otherwise:  
(5) a.  John walked {for/*in} ten minutes.  
b.  John walked to the station {*for/in} ten minutes.  
As the distribution of durational and frame adverbials shows in ‎(5), walk, when it 
stands alone, describes an atelic event, while when it is accompanied by to the station, 
it denotes a telic event. The studies that espouse the restriction of PPs to bounded 
ones relate the telicity to the obligatoriness of bounded PPs.  
Folli and Harley (2006), however, argue that the telicity is not relevant, presenting 
the data in ‎(6)a–c:  
(6) a.  John waltzed Matilda around and around the room {for/#in} three 
hours.  
b.  John walked Mary towards her car {for/#in} three hours.  
c.  John ran his dog along the canal {for/#in} three hours.  
(Folli and Harley 2006: 137) 
In ‎(6), the sentences are headed by an unergative activity verb, with an unbounded PP, 
resulting in atelic events. We also can add examples that have [-direction] PPs to the 
list:  
(7) a.  The mother walked her daughter in the park.  
b.  John walked his dog around the park.  
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c.  The general marched the soldiers around the park.  
From the data in ‎(6) and ‎(7), we conclude that neither the type of PP nor the telicity is 
relevant to the grammaticality of the unergative-based transitives.  
2.3 PPs may not be obligatory 
Davidese and Geyskens (1998) observe that PPs may be omitted in some cases: 2 
(8) a.  …you do not gallop a horse when approaching settlements  
b.  No American commander then in uniform had ever marched an entire 
division, much less a corps. (Davidese and Geyskens 1998: 169–170) 
Levin (1993: 31), who claims that the verb must be accompanied by a directional 
phrase to license this construction, notes that “even if such a phrase is not overtly 
expressed, it is understood”. Davidese and Geyskens (1998: 175), on the other hand, 
observe that examples like ‎(8)a are possible without inherent direction, noting that 
they are more focused on “the instigation of a specific manner of motion”. The 
observation based on our informants also confirms this statement. The sentences 
in ‎(9) all lack PPs, and nonetheless, all the informants we consulted judged them to be 
acceptable:  
(9) a.  The general marched the soldiers.  
b.  I walked my dog.3 
c.  The jockey jumped the horse.  
The informants observed that ‎(9)c, for example, becomes acceptable under the 
situation where the horse was practicing jumping, because it hadn‟t done it well. This 
interpretation focuses on the manner of motion of the causee (i.e. the horse). The 
other examples share the same kind of interpretation, and we name it exercise 
interpretation.  
That PP-less unergative-based transitives are felicitous under the exercise 
interpretation is confirmed by the following examples:  
                                                        
2
 Kageyama (2000) also observes that [+direction][+bounded] PPs (goal PPs, in his terms) may not 
be obligatory, providing the following example:  
(i) “I‟ll walk you a little ways,” he said. We started walking.  (Kageyama 2000:47) 
  It is true that there is no PP in (i), but it can be argued that an adverbial phrase that strongly 
implicates a direction (i.e. a little ways) serves to license the transitive sentence. Thus, we take the 
example as a counterexample to the “telicity”/ “goal” requirement, not to the “obligatoriness of PPs”.  
3
 The sentence is often said to be too‎“fixed” to argue for the non-obligatoriness of PPs. We do not 
have a solid answer to this reaction at this moment, but we conjecture that the dog-walking case is an 
instance of the exercise interpretation (see also Maruta 1998). 
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(10) a. # John walked Mary.  
b. #The mother walked her three year old daughter. 
c. # I ran my sister.  
The sentences in ‎(10) are judged to be unacceptable under normal situations (this is 
why we put „#‟, instead of „*‟ here). In ‎(10)a, for instance, in a normal situation, John 
does not have an overwhelming power over Mary, and does not have her practice 
walking. If a context allows this kind of situation, the sentence should be acceptable.  
Thus, the acceptability of transitive sentences is not related to the presence or 
absence of a PP, although the lack of PPs in the unergative-based transitives leads to 
an unconventional interpretation.  
The next section is devoted to the elucidation of the relationship between the 
presence/lack of PPs and the interpretation of unergative-based transtives.  
3 CAUSATIVE SEMANTICS AND PPS 
3.1 Sociative Causation  
To capture the distributional behavior of PPs in the unergative-based transitives in 
section 2, we adopt‎ the‎ semantic‎ category‎ of‎ „sociative‎ causation‟‎ proposed‎ by 
Shibatani and Pardeshi (2002).  
Sociative causation is added to the traditional classification of direct and indirect 
causations as the intermediate category between them.  Direct and indirect 
causations are defined by two features; the semantic roles and spatiotemporal 
overlapping of the causing and caused events.  As for the semantic roles, direct 
causation has an agentive causer and a patientive causee, while in indirect causation, 
both of the causer and the causee are agentive. From a spatiotemporal viewpoint, 
direct causation denotes a situation where two events (i.e. causing and caused events) 
are overlapped, and can be viewed as a single event. Indirect causation, on the other 
hand, describes the situation which involves spatiotemporally separated causing and 
caused events. The difference between these two types of causation is diagrammed in 




     (a) Direct causation               (b) Indirect causation 
<Figure 1> Direct vs. Indirect Causations (Shibatani and Pardeshi 2002: 90) 
This semantic opposition of direct/indirect causation tends to be iconically aligned 
with what types of causative forms are employed.  In general, direct causation is 
    AP  
L1/T1 
    AP  
L1/T1 
    A‟(P)  
L2/T2 
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associated with synthetic causative forms whereas indirect causation with analytic 
ones (e.g. –sase causative in Japanese). A significant split of distribution can also be 
found in the causativization of intransitive verbs. Cross-linguistically, unaccusative 
verbs tend to undergo lexical causativization and resist the analytic (syntactic) 
causativization. In contrast, unergative verbs tend to undergo analytic causativization 
and usually do not have lexical causative counterparts. This picture is illustrated in 
Table 2 with the Japanese examples. 
 
 lexical causative analytic causative (-sase) 
transitive (e.g. waru „break‟) -- 
war-ase-ru 














„make someone run‟ 
<Table 2> Lexical and analytic causatives 
Sociative causation lies in the middle of these two categories. It is similar to direct 
causation in that it describes a spatiotemporally overlapped single event, with a 
situation where the causer and the causee perform the same action. At the same time, 
it is close to indirect causation in that the causee bears an agentive role, not a 
patientive role.  
Marathi, a New Indo-Aryan language, provides a good example of sociative 
causation. In ‎(11)a and ‎(11)b, this language allows unaccusative as well as unergative 
intrantives to undergo synthetic causativization by means of the suffix –aw.  
However, the unergative-based causatives in ‎(11)b and the unaccusative-based 
causatives in ‎(11)a differ in terms of what semantic roles the causer and the causee 
bear. In ‎(11)a, the causer bears the agentive role and the causee the patientive role.  
In ‎(11)b, on the other hand, both the causer and causee play the agentive roles. 
(11) a.  aaT-Ne‎„get‎shrunk‟:‎aaT-aw-Ne‎„to‎shrink‎something‟ 
   bhidz-Ne‎„to‎get‎wet‟:‎bhidz-aw-Ne‎„to‎wet‎something‟ 
   suk-Ne‎„to‎become‎dry‟:‎suk-aw-Ne‎„to‎dry‎something‟ 
   buD-Ne‎„get‎drowned‟:‎buD-aw-Ne‎„to‎drown‎someone‟ 
   ghaabar-Ne‎„to‎get‎frightened‟:‎ghaabar-aw-Ne‎„to‎frighten‎someone‟ 
   paT-Ne‎„to‎get‎convinced‟:‎paT-aw-Ne‎„to‎convince‎someone 
 b.  tsaal-Ne‎„to‎walk‟:‎tsaal-aw-Ne‎„to‎make‎someone‎walk‟ 
   kheL-Ne‎„to‎play‟:‎kheL-aw-Ne‎„to‎make‎someone‎play‟ 
   mut-Ne‎„to‎urinate‟:‎mut-aw-Ne‎„to‎make‎someone‎urinate‟ 
   naats-Ne‎„to‎dance‟:‎naats-aw-Ne‎„to‎make‎someone‎dance‟ 
   paL-Ne‎„to‎run‟:‎paL-aw-Ne‎„to‎make‎someone‎run‟ 
    (Shibatani and Pardeshi 2002: 97) 
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The latter type of causation denoted by unergative-based –aw causatives is, however, 
different from a typical indirect causative situation whereby both the causer and the 
causee bear the agentive role. In the former, the causing and caused events are 
spatiotemporally overlapped, while in the latter they are not. This distinction is 
illustrated by ‎(12)b and ‎(12)c, both of which are causativized versions of a simple 
intransitive sentence ‎(12)a; in ‎(12)b, the implication that the subject entity (i.e. the 
causer) accompanies the causee cannot be canceled without anomaly, the cancellation 
causing no trouble in ‎(12)c. 
(12) a.  raam  don  kilomiTar  paL-l-aa 
   Ram   two   kilometer  run-PERF-M 
   „Ram ran two kilometers.‟ 
 b.  shaam-ne    raam-laa   don kilomiTar  paL-aw-l-a 
   Sham-ERG   Ram-DAT  two  kilometer  run-CAUS-PERF-N 
   *paN  shaam  raam-barobar  paL-l-aa      naahi 
   but    Sham   Ram-with     run-PERF-M   not 
[Sociative Causation] 
   „Sham made Ram run two kilometers but he did not run with Ram.‟ 
 c.  shaam-ne    raam-laa   don kilomiTar  paL-aaylaa  
   Sham-ERG  Ram-DAT  two kilometer   run-PTCP  
    au-l-a  
   make-PERF-N 
   paN  shaam  raam-barobar  paL-l-aa      naahi 
   but    Sham   Ram-with     run-PERF-M   not 
     [Indirect Causation] 
(adapted from Shibatani and Pardeshi 2002:97–98) 
 Shibatani and Pardeshi (2002) divide sociative causation further into three 
subcategories: Joint-action, Assistive, and Supervision. A relatively large conceptual 
chasm lies between the former two and Supervision. Joint-action and Assistive 
sociatives, just like direct causatives, entail physical involvement of the causer in the 
caused event, while Supervision sociative is more like indirect causation since the 
causer and the causee may be physically separated.  
The gap between Joint-action and Assistive sociatives is much smaller, but still 
significant. Joint-action sociative depicts a situation where the causer and the causee 
are engaged in the same action, whereas the causer in an Assistive sociative situation 
does not do exactly the same thing with the causee although their actions are closely 
connected (since the causee‟s action cannot obtain without the causer‟s helpful 
action).  
Thus, sociative causatives themselves form a continuum; Joint-action leans toward 
the direct-causation end and Supervision toward the indirect-causation end. This 
continuum as a whole, the causative continuum as they call, is seen clearly when the 
diagrams below are placed between Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b). 
 
 





    (a) Joint-action/Assistive               (b) Supervision 
<Figure 2> Sociative Causations (Shibatani and Pardeshi 2002: 101) 
In the following, we claim that the omissibility or obligatoriness of the PPs in 
unergative-based transitives is correlated with the types of causation depicted. 
3.2. Types of Causation and PPs 
The three subcategories of sociative causation are observed in the unergative-based 
transitive sentences in English. Let us first consider ‎(13):  
(13) a. # John walked Mary home last night, and/but he didn‟t walk with her.  
b.  John made Mary walk home last night, and/but he didn‟t walk with 
her.  
In ‎(13), the unergative-based transitive sentence is contrasted with the analytic 
(syntactic) causative by make. Their difference in the joint-action (or accompaniment) 
implication is clear: in ‎(13)a, the joint-action of John and Mary cannot be cancelled, 
while in ‎(13)b, such an implication is not associated with the sentence, permitting 
such a cancellation. This is expected if we assume that the unergative-based 
transitives in English are associated with the sociative causation. The following 
examples show the same point:  
(14) a. # A female teacher marched a naughty boy to the principal‟s office, but 
she didn‟t go with him. 
b.  A female teacher made a naughty boy march to the principal‟s office, 
but she didn‟t go with him. 
(15) a. # I ran her to the fence, and I didn‟t run with her. 
b.  I made her run to the fence, and I didn‟t run with her. 
The cases which are considered to fall into the category of Assistive sociative are 
also acknowledged: 
(16) a. # The nurse walked the patient to the geriatric ward, but/and she was 
not with him. 
b.  The nurse made the patient walk to the geriatric ward, but/and she 
was not with him.  
    AA‟  
L1/T1-2 
    A‟(P)  
L1,2/T2 
    AA‟(P)  
L1/T1 
 
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(17) a. # The jockey jumped the horse over the fence, but/and he was not on 
his back then. (=just ordered it to do so.)4 
b.  The jockey made the horse jump over the fence, but/and he was not 
on his back then. (=just ordered it to do so.) 
In the examples in ‎(16) and ‎(17), what is cancelled is not the joint-action of the causer 
and the causee, but the assistantship of the causer to the causee. In the (a) variants, the 
assistive interpretation is strongly associated with the transitive sentences, whereas 
the (b) sentences do not have this implication. The crucial aspect of the assistive 
interpretation is, as noted above, the temporal overlapping of the causing and the 
caused events: both in ‎(16)a and ‎(17)a, the implication that the causer is with the 
causee, assisting him, is crucial.  
Finally, the Supervision-sociative interpretation is also observed.  
(18) a.  The general marched the soldiers to the tents, but he didn‟t march 
with them.  
b.  The general made the soldiers march to the tents, but he didn‟t march 
with them.  
(19) a.  The trainer ran the athletes around the field, while he was just 
watching over them (he didn‟t run with them). 
b.  The trainer made the athletes run around the field, while he was just 
watching over them (he didn‟t run with them).  
Both ‎(18) and ‎(19) clearly designate situations where the causer does not engage in 
the same activity as the causee, or the causer does not help him/her do the activity. 
Instead, the situations described are the ones where the causer just ordered the 
causee(s) to do the activity while s/he is watching over them. In this case, the lack of 
accompaniment does not yield anomaly.  
Having established that the unergative-based transitives in English may have all 
the three categories of sociative causation, we would like to show that the 
interpretations associated with the sentences are correlated with the omissibility of 
PPs. Let us consider the following paradigm:  
(20) a.  John walked Mary home.  
b. #John walked Mary.  
(21) a.  A female teacher marched the naughty boy to the principal‟s office.  
b. # A female teacher marched the naughty boy.  
(22) a.  The nurse walked the patient to the geriatric ward.  
b. ??The nurse walked the patient.  
(23) a.  The general marched the soldiers to the tents. 
b.  The general marched the soldiers.  
                                                        
4
 Both in ‎(17)a and ‎(17)b, the causee has to be (at least) an animate object in this interpretation. See 
below in this section for this point.  
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(24) a.  The trainer ran the athletes around the field.  
b.  The trainer ran the athletes.  
The examples in ‎(20) and ‎(21) describe the Joint-action situations, which do not 
license the PP-less unergative-based transitives. In contrast, as regards ‎(22), which 
describes an Assistive situation, our informants reported that the anomaly of the 
PP-less transitive would be milder than that of the join-action examples. As to ‎(23) 
and ‎(24), all the informants consulted said that the PP-less sentences are acceptable. 
These examples are intended to refer to the supervision situation in which the causing 
event is not fully overlapped spatiotemporally with the caused event.  
As the paradigm shows, whether PPs are obligatory or not is closely connected 
with the causative situation the sentence describes: if the sentence is understood to 
denote a situation of Joint-action or Assistive causation, the PP cannot be omitted, 
while, if the sentence receives a Supervision interpretation, the PP is optional.  
We would like to note here that we do not regard the „unacceptability‟ of 
(b)-sentences in ‎(20)–‎(22) as „ungrammaticality‟, but just as „(semantic) anomaly‟ 
under the normal situation. Take ‎(20)b, for example. Given that John and Mary are in 
some relationship which requires Mary to obey the order by John (e.g. the 
general-soldier relationship), the sentence would be acceptable just as ‎(23)b. The 
situation ‎(20)a describes is usually not of this kind, and that is the source of the 
anomaly. Thus, if we can somehow force a Supervision interpretation, all these 
anomalous sentences would become acceptable.  
This is also confirmed by the following examples:  
(25) a.  John walked his bike through Okaido.  
b. * John walked his bike.  
(26) a.  The quarterback ran the ball to the goal.  
b. * The quarterback ran the ball.  
(27) a.  The burglar ran the money up the hill.  
b. * The burglar ran the money.  
The examples above have an inanimate object, which cannot be an agent in the caused 
event. Thus, the only possible interpretation of these cases is the Joint-action, which 
necessarily involves the action of the causer to complete the caused event. As shown 
in the unacceptability of ‎(25)b, ‎(26)b and ‎(27)b, these cases strongly resist the 
omission of PPs.  
The generalization about the omissibility of PPs seems to explain the nature of the 
„exercise‟ interpretation. As noted above, if the unergative-based transitive lacks a PP, 
the sentence is often interpreted to describe an exercise situation. In ‎(23)b and ‎(24)b, 
the typically intended situations are the ones where the general/the trainer makes the 
soldiers/athletes march/run to train them. To account for this tendency, we need to 
make clear what constitute the causing and caused events in this type of transitives.  
In the previous section, we saw that the sociative causation is defined to constitute 
the intermediate category between direct and indirect causations, with an agentive 
causee and a spatiotemporally close relationship between causing and caused events. 
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However, in light of the data given in ‎(25)–‎(27), the causee may be non-agentive in 
the Joint-action causation. In this interpretation, therefore, the one who performs the 
action denoted by the main predicate is primarily the causer, not the causee. This is 
also confirmed by the following example:  
(28) a.  John drove Mary home.  
b.  John drove.  
c.  Mary drove.   
What is entailed in ‎(28)a is ‎(28)b, not ‎(28)c. Mary did not drive the car, but she just 
sat in the car to be carried to her house. Thus, in the Joint-action interpretation, the 
causing event is the event denoted by the main predicate (i.e. driving, in this case), 
and the caused event is the change of location/motion of the causee.  
In the Supervision situation, the patientive causee cannot be allowed (see footnote 
4): the causee is the one who performs the action. In this interpretation, the causing 
event is the causer‟s ordering or supervising of the causee, whereas the caused event 




 Causing event Caused event 
joint-action the causer‟s V-ing the causee‟s motion 
assistive the causer‟s V-ing the causee‟s motion 
supervision the causer‟s order/supervision the causee‟s V-ing(+motion) 
<Table 3> Causing and caused events in sociative causation 
As shown in Table 3, the Joint-action/Assistive causations, the causee‟s motion is 
the necessary condition for the caused event to obtain. The motion event is explicitly 
marked by a PP. This is why the PP is obligatory in this interpretation. On the other 
hand, the supervision situation does not require the motion component to establish the 
caused event: the presence of the motion does not contribute to the licensing of the 
caused event. Thus, the PP, which is responsible for the motion component, can be 
optional under this interpretation.  
When a unergative-based transitive sentence in the supervision interpretation lacks 
a PP, as in ‎(29)a, it induces the following meaning, as described in ‎(29)b:  
(29) a.  The general marched the soldiers.  
b.  The general was supervising soldiers, and they were made to march 
under his supervision.  
The denoted situation is naturally understood against our background knowledge 
about the general-soldier relationship: marching is one of the things that soldiers have 
to do, and the general is in the position to supervise them by giving orders. In this 
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interpretation, a focus is on the action performed by the causee, not the motion. This 
supervised action interpretation naturally leads to the „exercise‟ implication. Thus, we 
claim that the „exercise‟ meaning, which is often associated with the PP-less 
transitives, is a side effect of the supervision interpretation with a focused action 
component.  
3.3 A Comparison with Maruta (1998) 
At least to our knowledge, Maruta (1998) presents the most thorough investigation to 
the unergative-based transitives with respect to the causative semantics. In this section, 
we would like to review his analysis and make a comparison with the analysis 
presented here.  
Maruta (1998), following Talmy (1985), maintains that two types of causation 
pertain to lexical causatives in English: Onset and Extended Causations. Onset 
causation, represented by INITIATE, describes a causative situation where the causer 
is only responsible for the initiation of the causing event, and is not involved in the 
outcome of the caused event. In Extended causation, on the other hand, the causer has 
an effect over the whole causative event, namely from the causing event to the caused 
event. The Extended causation is represented by CAUSE.  
(30) a.  Onset Causation  
   [x ACT ON y] INITIATE [y....] 
 b.  Extended Causation  
   [x ACT ON y] CAUSE [y ....]  
(Maruta 1998: 100; with a minor modification) 
Maruta (1998) further maintains that the agentive verbs, including manner of 
motion verbs, involve causative semantics with a slightly elaborated structure. Maruta 
(1998) first distinguishes the double function that the (traditional) Agent role bears; 
the Agent could be an intentional instigator as well as a performer (doer) of an action. 
Maruta (1998) names the first Vol(itional)-Initiator, and the latter Effector. In his 
theory, run, as an agentive verb, has the following lexical semantic structure:  
(31) run: [x DO AN ACT OF VOL] INITIATE [x RUN]  
   Vol-Initiator                    Effector 
In ‎(31), the argument of DO AN ACT OF VOL serves as a Vol-Initiator, and that of 
RUN is an Effector. The two roles are, however, borne by the same individual.  
Maruta (1998) views that in the unergative-based transitives, the two roles (i.e. 
Vol-Initiator and Efffector) are manifested by two different individuals. To capture 
this, he proposes the process of „de-reflexivization‟, which assigns different 
individuals to the two roles. To boost this process, we need to augment the structure 
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with a CAUSE predicate. This is what goal PPs work for.  
(32)  run to the store: [[x DO AN ACT OF VOL] INITIATE [x RUN]] 
CAUSE [BECOME [x AT the store]] 
Note that Maruta‟s (1998) theory is based on the observation that goal PPs are 
required to license the unergative-based transitives (see Table 1 in Section 2.1). In the 
lexical structure in ‎(32), the three „x‟s are differentiated by the process of 
de-reflexivization. There are two options for this: one is that the first and the second 
arguments are identified as the components of a single individual, and the third 
argument is realized as another individual; the other is that the second and the third 
argument are identified, and the first one is realized as a different individual. The first 
option gives rise to an Extended causation interpretation, since the main predicate is 
CAUSE in this structure. The second option, on the other hand, induces an Onset 
causation, which is headed by INITIATE. The results of the two types of 
de-reflexivization are given below:  
(33) a.  Extended Causation interpretation: 
   [x DO AN ACT OF VOL] INITIATE [x RUN] CAUSE [BECOME 
[y AT the store]] 
 b.  Onset Causation interpretation:  
   [x DO AN ACT OF VOL] INITIATE [y RUN] CAUSE [BECOME 
[y AT the store]] 
As noted above, the Extended causation induces the interpretation where the 
causer bears the responsibility for the entire event. Maruta (1998) argues that the 
following examples fall into the category of the Extended causation, because in these 
examples, the causer (i.e. the subject) is understood to accompany the cause 
throughout the caused event:  
(34) a.  John walked Mary home.   [with an animate causee] 
b.  The quarterback ran the ball to the goal.  [with an inanimate causee] 
‎(34)b supports his point: the causee in this example is an inanimate entity, which 
entails that the object itself does not run or move, and the causer should have the 
responsibility both for the causing and caused events. In this case, the causer bears 
both of Vol-Initiator and Effector roles, and the causee bears only the Theme role 
specified by BECOME predicate.  
In an Onset-causation situation, on the other hand, the causer is just an instigator 
of the event: it does not have an effect over the caused event. Maruta (1998) claims 
that the following examples show this pattern of interpretation:  
(35) a.  The jockey jumped the horse over the fence.  
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b.  The psychologist ran the rat through the maze.  
In these cases, it is clear that the causer does not carry out the action described by the 
main predicate, and the causee is the one that jumps or runs. The causer just gives an 
order to undertake the action.  
It is clear that Maruta‟s (1998) analysis is similar to our analysis presented above 
in that the unergative-based transitives are associated with more than one types of 
causation: The Extended causation seems to correspond to the Joint-action sociative 
causation/direct causation, and the Onset causation to the Supervision sociative 
causation/indirect causation. However, there are several differences between his 
analysis and ours. We would like to point them out below.  
First, Maruta (1998) bases his argument on the observation that PPs are obligatory 
in this type of transitives. As we showed above, this is not always the case. Since the 
de-reflexivization process works only when the lexical structure has three identical 
arguments, the augmented structure by a PP has to be present. Furthermore, a PP-less 
lexical structure would not yield two types of causative semantics. Thus, in his 
analysis, the presence of PPs should be crucial, although the fact is opposite.5 
The second difference lies in the causative semantics acknowledged. We identified 
three types of sociative causation, as discussed above, while Maruta (1998) posits two 
types of causatives. As noted above, the Extended causation can be equated with the 
Joint-action sociative causation (and direct causation), and the Onset causation with 
the Supervision sociative causation (and indirect causation). In this alignment, the 
Assistive sociative causation cannot be included. The Assistive causation lies in the 
middle of the Joint-action and the Supervision. This is observed, as we argued above, 
in the cancellation of the accompaniment entailment. Let us look at the examples 
again:  
(36) a. # John walked Mary home, but he didn‟t walk with her.  
b. # The mother walked her three year old daughter to the preschool, but 
she [=the mother] didn‟t walk with her.  
(37) a.  The jockey jumped the horse over the fence, but he didn‟t jump with 
it.   
b. # The jockey jumped the horse over the fence, but he wasn‟t on its back 
then. 
(38) a.  The general marched the soldiers to the tents, but he didn‟t walk with 
them. 
b.  The general marched the soldiers to the tent, while he was watching 
over them. 
                                                        
5
 We might rescue his analysis by positing that the de-reflexivization process may operate if there are 
at least two identical arguments (see Kageyama (2000), for a similar proposal). In that modified analysis, 
a PP-less lexical structure would have the structure in (i), which should have the only interpretation: the 
Onset causation.  
(i) [x DO AN ACT OF VOL] INITIATE [y RUN] 
(i) predicts that the causee (=y) cannot be an inanimate, because the argument itself is the performer 
of the action described by the verb.  
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The examples in ‎(37)a–b are intended to denote the Assistive causations. If the 
Assistive causation were a subcategory of the Extended causation, it would have an 
accompaniment implication, just as ‎(36)a–b. If, on the other hand, the Assistive 
causation were a subcategory of the Onset causation, it would induce no 
accompaniment connotation (Maruta 1998: 101–102). The examples in ‎(37) show that 
the sentence does not have accompaniment, but have a weaker notion of „assistance‟. 
This is sharply contrasted with a syntactic causative formed by make, which clearly 
marks the independence of the causer of the caused event:  
(39) a.  The jockey made the horse jump over the fence, but he didn‟t jump 
with it.  
b.  The jockey made the horse jump over the fence, but he wasn‟t on its 
back then.  
Thus, as we claimed, three categories of socicative causation are observed in the 
unergative-based transitves in English, rather than just two.  
The final difference is concerned with the „exercise‟ interpretation. We proposed 
that the exercise interpretation is the motion-less variant of the Supervision causation, 
while Maruta (1998) posits that it constitutes a totally different predicate. In Maruta 
(1998), the exercise interpretation arises from the lexical transitive frame „x 
EXERCISE y‟, which is independent of the unergative-based transitive sentences, 
since his analysis is based on the observation that PPs are obligatory to license the 
transitives. Our analysis, on the other hand, which clarified the relationship between 
the PP omissibility and the causative semantics, can deal with the exercise 
interpretation as a natural pragmatic extension/accommodation from the supervision 
causation.  
4 CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we dealt with the problem associated with the status of PPs in the 
unergative-based transitives in English, and tried to give a thorough description of 
their controversial distribution. To accomplish this, we proposed to entertain the 
notion of the sociative causation, and showed that the three categories of the sociative 
causation (Joint-action, Assistive, and Supervision) are observed in English. We 
claimed that the omissibility of PPs is closely related to which causative interpretation 
the sentence might have: when the sentence may have the supervision interpretation, a 
PP can be optional. We also suggested that the so-called „exercise‟ interpretation, 
which is available when the PP is missing, can be captured as a pragmatic 
accommodation from the Supervision-causative interpretation.  
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